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Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the
UK’s Top Judges∗
T T Arvind† Lindsay Stirton‡
In the United States, appointments to the Supreme Court are more
political, and therefore there is a stronger possibility that the com-
position of the court might affect the outcome. This is not the case
in the United Kingdom.1
Everyone knows that the composition of the Court has an impact
on the outcome of cases.2
Introduction
The last four decades have been a period of radical change for the UK’s judiciary,
witnessing among other things the creation of a new action of judicial review, the
acquisition by judges of the power to review laws for compatibility with human
rights, fundamental changes to civil procedure and the funding of litigation, a
new process for the appointment of judges, and the creation of a new Supreme
Court. In none of these reforms, however, was much consideration given to the
potential institutional impact they might have upon the judiciary, or to the
questions of function and design that one would ordinarily associate with the
restructuring of an important governing institution. Would changes to caseloads
and appointment processes affect the way in which the judicial branch perceived
or discharged its role? Would new powers and procedures, and a new funding
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1 Department of Constitutional Affairs (2003) Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court
for the United Kingdom CP 11/03, London, Department of Constitutional Affairs, para. 52.
2 Richard Cornes, Memorandum to the Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform
Bill, 28 April 2003, at para. 7.
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2settlement, affect the relationship between the judiciary and other branches of
government?
The neglect of institutional issues in judicial reform presents a striking con-
trast to the reform of other institutions of the state, where issues of structure
and design received sustained attention. And it presents a puzzle. It is not
denied that judges differ systematically in their views on the law, and that
their judgments to some extent reflect views peculiar to them.3 Journals are
filled with articles analysing the jurisprudence developed by particular judges in
the course of their career,4 or discussing at length how leading judges differ in
their approach to important legal questions ranging from insolvency law5 to the
boundary between private and public law.6 Judges themselves acknowledge such
differences and their impact upon cases.7 The dominant view is, nevertheless,
that these differences lack institutional significance. The reason for this appears
to lies in a sense of judicial exceptionalism: because the judiciary is not politi-
cal in the way that other institutions or even other judiciaries are, matters such
as judicial appointments, bench-constitution procedures, and decision-making
processes are not an immediate concern.
The purpose of this article is to argue that this complacent acceptance of ju-
dicial exceptionalism is profoundly misconceived. The structure and functioning
of the UK’s judiciary pose the same sort of concerns in relation to institutional
design and institutional weaknesses as any other branch of the state, even if
judges are not ‘political’, and neither can nor should ignored. Our article be-
gins (Part I) by examining the relationship between “political” models of the
judiciary and “legal” models. We argue that far from being rivals, the two
accounts are perfectly compatible and shed significant light on each other. Doc-
trinal adjudication is intelligible not just legally—as a theory of law—but also
politically—as a theory of governing institutions within a political system.
Part II puts our hybrid “doctrinal” model to a test through a statistical
analysis of thirty years of decisions in one specific area—cases against public
bodies—using a red-light / green-light scale based on the work of Harlow and
Rawlings. We show that there are measurable ideological differences between
judges in the UK’s top court, which affect the outcome of cases and the direction
in which the law evolves. In Part III, we argue that the failure to take institu-
tional issues seriously means that changes to the structure and functioning of
the judiciary are, in contemporary policy-making, approached in a cavalier way
that would be unthinkable in relation to any other governing institution, and
which has the potential to seriously undermine the effectiveness of the judiciary.
Remedying this calls for far closer engagement by lawyers with the insights of
3 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Palgrave Macmillan 1983); Brice Dickson, ‘The Processing
of Appeals in the House of Lords’ (2007) 123(4) Law Quarterly Review 571.
4 Michael Fordham, ‘Lord Bingham’s Legacy’ (2009) 14(1) Judicial Review 103.
5 Gerard McCormick, ‘Lords Hoffmann and Millett and the Shaping of Credit and Insol-
vency Law’ [2005] (4) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 491.
6 See Carol Harlow, State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford University Press 2004).
7 See Lord Hoffmann in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] AC 455, 502,
speculating that a different bench would probably have decided McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983]
1 AC 410 differently.
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‘the new institutionalism’ in political science,8 and with the questions of the
structure, form and design of judicial institutions that our discipline has thus
far ignored.
1 The Attitudinal Model and Legal Doctrine
On the face of it, the legal model of adjudication represents a view on what it
is judges seek to do, which is different to the point of being incommensurable
with political-institutional models, which see adjudication in terms of political
ideology. In this section, however, we argue that this impression results from
judicial politics scholars and legal scholars fundamentally misunderstanding each
others’ claims in relation to the courts as governing institutions. In reality, both
seek to explain the same thing—the nature of judicial discretion, and the things
that influence the manner in which judges exercise it—and the answers they
offer are complementary rather than contradictory.
The attitudinal model seeks to place the judiciary on the same footing as
other political institutions.9 Its key claim is that judging is political in a spe-
cific ‘policy-oriented’ sense.10 Judges, on this view, behave like “single-minded
seekers of legal policy”11 who decide cases so as to promote their preferred ide-
ological position, which are usually seen as lying on a liberal/conservative axis.
This ‘policy-seeking’ view of judges fits well with spatial theories of politics,
and the theory is also perceived as fitting the facts. Studies of the attitudinal
model have provided a good fit of observed judicial decision on the US Supreme
Court, the German Constitutional Court,12 and (to a lesser extent) on US state
supreme courts, which has made it seem ‘right’13
The model has, however, been rejected in the UK. The attitudes involved in
judicial decision-making in the UK, it is claimed, are “so subtle and complex”
and the cases “so difficult... to categorise” that “it would be impossible to in-
fer a judge’s legal ideology from his voting pattern.”14 Differences in judges’
voting records thus cannot “be tied straightforwardly to differences of politi-
cal ideology.”15 Empirically, too, estimates of the top judges’ ideal points are
8 RM Smith, ‘Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public
Law’ (1988) 82(1) The American Political Science Review 89.
9 Robert A Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker’ (1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 279.
10 Richard Hodder-Williams, ‘Six Notions of ‘Political’ and the United States Supreme
Court’ (1992) 22(1) British Journal of Political Science 1.
11 Tracey E George and Lee Epstein, ‘On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making’
(1992) 86(2) The American Political Science Review 323, 325.
12 Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge University
Press 2005).
13 Jeffrey A Segal, ‘Judicial Behavior’ in Keith Whittington, R Daniel Keleman, and Gregory
A Caldeira (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008)
pp. 27-8.
14 D Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Clarendon Press 1998) 35.
15 Thomas Poole and Sangeeta Shah, ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’ (2011) 74(1)
The Modern Law Review 79, p. 104. A partial exception to this trend was JAG Griffith,
who argued that the decisions of the senior judiciary remained overtly political and reflected
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said not to represent positions on a liberal/conservative axis at all, but only a
judge’s “propensity to dissent.”16 Critics also point out that the model does
a significantly worse job of explaining decisions on subordinate US courts, and
jurisdictions such as Canada.17
Yet these criticisms are unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, they present
an incomplete account of the judiciary, in that they offer no alternative explana-
tion for the acknowledged differences between judges. If judges’ positions cannot
be characterized as occupying a political space, then what sort of space do they
occupy? Secondly, and more importantly, this misunderstands both what ju-
dicial politics scholars mean by ‘attitudes’, and the place of a left/right scale
in the attitudinal model. The question the judicial politics literature seeks to
explain is why judges decide the way they do. The influence of the behavioural-
ist tradition, which saw the central intellectual task of political science to be
that of explaining the behaviour of political actors such as politicians, voters,
bureaucrats, and judges, led to an aspiration towards value-neutral description
and explanation of judicial behaviour.
Critically, however, nothing in the behavioural tradition suggests that differ-
ences in judicial attitudesmust be represented as occurring on a classic left/right
scale. There are three distinct and potentially severable strands in the attitu-
dinal model, of which the conventional liberal–conservative axis is only one.
Disaggregated, these are: (a) a hypothesis that judicial decisions reflect per-
sonal attitudes held by individual judges; (b) the spatial representation of these
positions, typically using sophisticated statistical techniques—these days, typi-
cally Bayesian item-response theory—to estimate judges’ positions; and (c) the
interpretation of such estimates as positions on a liberal/ conservative or left–
right ideological dimension. The objections discussed above have been levelled
almost exclusively at (c), and do not require the rejection of (a) or (b). The
failure of the classic left/right scale simply points to the need to identify an
alternate dimension on which it does make sense to measure judicial attitudes.
How, then, might we identify such a dimension? The “left/right” dimension
came to be accepted in judicial politics scholarship as an alternative to the
traditional legal account of decision-making, which suggested that judges decide
in accordance with doctrine. If the attitudinal model has failed, might this
“doctrinal” model provide us with the tools we need to identify the space which
judicial positions occupy? There are three reasons to think that it may.
The first is that the doctrinal model does not in fact posit the mechanistic
account of decision making that judicial politics scholars claim it embodies. It
does not deny that judges often differ systematically in their views as to the
law, or assert that such differences are irrelevant to how they decide cases. The
claim is, rather, that the differences are located on a scale best described in the
predominantly conservative leanings, but his view remains a minority position. See J A G
Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5th, HarperCollins Publishers September 1997).
16 Chris Hanretty, ‘The Decisions and Ideal Points of British Law Lords’ (2012) 43(03)
British Journal of Political Science 703, 710.
17 CL Ostberg and Matthew E Wetstein, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
(Cambridge University Press 2005).
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categories of legal doctrine. The claims made by the doctrinal model, in other
words, are claims in relation to the dimensions that are salient in determining
how judges decide cases. Given the fact that the left/right dimension turns out
not to have salience, it is worth exploring whether these dimensions do.
Secondly, a dimension of salience defined in doctrinal terms is intelligible not
just in terms of legal theory, but also within the tradition of political institu-
tionalism. Attitudinalist criticism of ‘the legal model’ usually boils down to a
rejection of what is portrayed as a structural account of the judiciary which de-
picts judges decisions as determined by pre-existing structures of the law (rules
and doctrine). In its place, behaviouralist political scientists offer a pure agency
account that depicts judges as deciding based on their own “sincere ideological
values.”18 The role of legal doctrine is purely epiphenomenal, either an ex post
facto rationalisation of the judge’s decision or (less charitably) a fabric from
which the judge can fashion comforting lies that judges use to mollify the losers
of the cases before them.19
But this is a mischarcterisation of the role which doctrinal scholars claim
it plays within the legal process. Stripped to its essentials, doctrine—the rules
and principles derived from legislation and case law—does no more than ad-
dress a problem which is well known in the literatures on both law and public
administration; namely, guiding the manner in which a decision-maker exercises
discretion. Legal doctrine does so indirectly, by directing a decision-maker to
consider certain factors, but not others.20 The effect of placing a certain problem
within the legal category ‘contract’, for example, is to direct a judge’s attention
away from issues of substantive fairness (is the government being overcharged
for the outsourced services?); whereas putting a problem within the category
‘human rights’ directs a judge towards issues of substantive fairness (is the scale
of the infringement proportionate to the public purpose pursued?).
In constraining the exercise of discretion, legal doctrine does not operate
through specific rules of the type that one may see in relation to an adminis-
trative authority. The superior courts are unlike, say, a local authority which
enforces noise pollution norms under Part III of the Environmental Protection
Act 1990 through the application bright-line rules expressed in terms of deci-
bels. Nor are they given clear and specific policy objectives to pursue, as is the
case with the Financial Conduct Authority. They typically operate, instead,
through relatively open-textured concepts,21 such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘bias’ or
‘legitimate expectations’. Whilst these concepts, of their nature, are not capable
of precise definition and hence give the judiciary some flexibility in deploying
them in deciding cases, their application in a given case is nevertheless guided
by precedent, which constrains the ability of judges to simply decide cases in
18 Segal (n 13) 24.
19 Martin Shapiro, ‘Judges as Liars’ (1994) 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
155.
20 Frederick Schauer, ‘Formalism: Legal, Constitutional, Judicial’ in Keith Whittington, R
Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A Caldeira (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics
(Oxford University Press 2008).
21 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (1st edn, Clarendon Press 1961) 124.
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accordance with their ideological preferences. The result is a picture where
doctrine—much like any institution—both enables and constrains the exercise
of discretion; and where much of its effect lies not just in the formal institu-
tions of legislation and rules, but also in the informal institutions—the ‘law in
lawyers’ heads”22—that guide the application of those open-textured rules and
concepts to a given case.
Judicial decision-making is therefore neither as malleable or as lacking in
guidance as the agency account would have it nor as externally controlling as
a purely structural account would be. Instead, judges have considerable scope
to engage in institutional entrepreneurship—shaping the very institutions that
constrain them. T. B. Lawrence captures the strategic element to such institu-
tional entrepreneurship in the phrase ‘institutional strategy’.23 An institutional
strategy is one in which a conscious effort is made to transform or influence the
functioning of institutions so as to establish a predilection towards a particu-
lar type of outcome, or a particular approach to evaluative decision-making.24
Institutional entrepreneurs engage in institutional strategy by articulating and
defending particular institutional practices (and criticizing others) so as to shape
institutional change.
Viewing different legal approaches as institutional strategies suggests that
they may be far more complex and layered than strategies devised and pursued
by judges as a matter of individual entrepreneurship would be. Viewing them
as informal institutions in addition lets us provide for the fact that there may,
at any time, be a number of different institutional strategies co-existing within
the judicial system, which different judges will buy into in different ways, and
which can exhibit surprising continuities over time.25 A doctrinal scale is thus
a scale of institutional strategies, expressed in the terms in which legal actors
articulate them. Such a scale may approximate to a liberal/conservative strategy
in environments where, for example, the tests posed by doctrine are closely
linked to political positions, or where institutional features of particular courts—
such as the nature of cases coming before them, the appointment of judges, and
procedures for reaching decisions—encourage a political approach to decision-
making, but would not do so elsewhere.
Thirdly, there are sound reasons why deciding cases doctrinally, in terms
somewhat removed from those of political disagreement, is desirable as an ap-
proach to governing, at least for institutions that occupy the place the judiciary
does in the modern British State. In addition to being open-textured, legal rules
are typically expressed in socially embedded language. The words and concepts
22 LM Lopucki, ‘Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads’ (1996) 90
Northwestern University Law Review 1498.
23 Thomas B Lawrence, ‘Institutional Strategy’ (1999) 25(2) Journal of Management 161.
24 It is important to note that it is the effort that is conscious rather than the strategy.
Lawrence suggests that “institutional strategies can develop both deliberately as intended
strategies, and unintentionally as emergent strategies.” ibid, p. 167.
25 The speeches of Parke B and Pollock LCB to the House of Lords in Egerton v Brownlow
(1853) 4 HLC 1, for instance, predate the formalism / realism debate in contract by several
generations, but bear a striking resemblance to the positions that would be taken in that
debate by judges and jurists.
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of legal doctrine—such as ‘cause’, ‘unreasonableness’, ‘expectation’, ‘using pow-
ers for an unauthorized purpose’—are close to everyday experience, and derive
their legal content primarily from cases involving everyday situations.
This gives the resulting institution a high degree of what Peter Evans has
called ‘embedded autonomy’.26 Channelling the exercise of discretion through
legal doctrine gives the judiciary a degree of autonomy from social pressures (in
that the claims of each contestant are considered not in and of themselves, but
through the reductionist lens of doctrine) as well as political pressures (in that
positions as represented in the conceptual framework of legal doctrine do not
have an exact correspondence with particular political stances). At the same
time, because doctrine is built on concepts drawn from everyday experience and
through cases reflecting everyday conflicts, its development remains embedded
in broader social needs and perspectives. Whilst such a judiciary is not political
in the policy-seeking sense, it remains political in a definitional sense, in that
it “authoritatively allocates values”, as well as in a systemic sense, in that its
decisions have consequences for other parts of the political system.27
Viewing legal doctrine in these terms makes it clear why a doctrinal model of
adjudication is both intelligible and ‘political’ in a definitional sense. Doctrinal
positions do not merely represent personal philosophies as to desirable outcomes
or objectives. They are ‘institutionalized’, in that they are part of an identifiable
legal and judicial culture, which in turn is a component of the overall approach
of governance taken within a state. In the context of the UK, this understanding
is visible in the work of JAG Griffith on the politics of the judiciary.
Griffith makes a definitional claim about the nature of politics, as well as
an institutional claim about the relationship between courts and other govern-
ing institutions when he suggests that “Judges are part of the machinery of
authority within the State and as such cannot avoid the making of political
decisions.”28 Yet, because the focus of his work was upon questions concerning
controversial social issues which were typically distributional—the preference
for collective over private consumption, or the role of trade unions—the focus
of the debate around his thesis was on “the influencing, pragmatic and partisan
notions” of politics,29 rather than his definitional or institutional claims.
As others have pointed out, one reason why the political aspect of judging
has so often been ignored in the UK (as well as, one might add, why the rela-
tively few works that explicitly address the politics of judging have attracted so
much controversy) is the persistence of such a ‘political controversy’ approach
among both lawyers and political scientists.30 Looking beyond cases and studies
involving controversial distributive issues makes these broader aspects of ‘polit-
ical’ models—and their relevance to the questions lawyers ask—much clearer.
26 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton Uni-
versity Press 1995).
27 Hodder-Williams (n 10).
28 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester University Press 1977) p. 190.
29 Hodder-Williams (n 10).
30 S Sterett, ‘Politics and Jurisprudence in the British Courts’ (1988) 1(2) Canadian Journal
of Law and Jurisprudence 173.
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2 Testing the doctrinal model statistically
2.1 Constructing a doctrinal scale
The account we have so far advanced provides a framework for understanding
judicial politics and a theory for analysing judicial decision-making in the su-
perior courts of the United Kingdom, rather than a model.31 Nevertheless, its
observable implications make it amenable to empirical evaluation. Specifically,
it suggests that the salient dimension of judicial disagreement will ordinarily
correspond to the sort of matters to which doctrine directs judicial decision-
making, rather than necessarily reflecting party-political ideology.
The structure and workload of the UK’s judiciary further suggests that our
understanding of judicial attitudes is better framed in a narrower and more fo-
cused way than a liberal/conservative scale. The US Supreme Court’s workload
is shaped by the absence of a Federal common law, and the limited powers of
the Federal government in private law. The UK Supreme Court, in contrast,
does hear such cases quite regularly. Liberal and conservative ideologies do not
provide much assistance when it comes to answering questions in relation to
the precise proportion of damages to be reduced in a case of contributory neg-
ligence,32 or whether a company followed contractual procedures while making
a decision affecting a counterparty,33 to pick two recent examples. Simultane-
ously, the absence of a general power to judicially review primary legislation
eliminates cases in which party-political ideologies are most salient, and in re-
lation to which institutional strategies grounded in such ideologies are likely to
be most useful. The result is to restrict the usefulness of liberal and conserva-
tive ideologies not just as institutional strategies for deciding cases, but also as
vehicles for institutional entrepreneurship in developing the law.
Secondly, institutional differences between the UK and the US, particularly
in the ‘informal’ institutions that comprise each jurisdiction’s constitutional
culture,34 also reduce the acceptability of liberal and conservative ideologies both
as institutional strategies and vehicles for institutional entrepreneurship. Of
particular importance is the theoretical and rhetorical role which parliamentary
sovereignty plays in the UK’s constitutional culture. The impact of this on
judicial positions can be seen from the fact that judges in the UK have repeatedly
invoked parliamentary sovereignty in discussing their role under the Human
Rights Act. They powers, they have emphasised “have been ceded to them by
Parliament” and as things presently stand “Parliament can take them back.”35
31 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press 2005)
27-29.
32 Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5.
33 Braganza v BP Shipping Limited [2015] UKSC 17.
34 The concept of ‘constitutional culture’ we use is derived from Lawrence Friedman, and
incorporates what he referred to as “internal legal culture” — shared understandings held by
legal actors — as well as what he termed “external legal culture” — shared understandings
held by non-legal actors. See Lawrence Friedman, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’ in David
Nelken (ed), Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth 1997).
35 See eg the remarks of Elias LJ, ‘The rise of the Strasbour-
geoise: judicial activism and the ECHR’ (Annual Lord Renton Lec-
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Equally, they have stressed that judges do in fact seek to respect Parliamentary
sovereignty when exercising powers under the Human Rights Act, even though
the Act will inevitably require them to pronounce on questions that have a
political dimension.36 Thus Lord Judge, in an interview with Radio 4 in 2013,
drew a sharp distinction between the application of human rights by judges in
the UK and judges on the European Court of Human Rights. Judges in the UK,
he said, respected the sovereignty of Parliament in legislating on societal issues,
unlike judges in Strasbourg.37 This has no counterpart in the US, and it makes
it significantly less likely that the salient dimension of judicial disagreement will
be measurable on a scale of political ideology, as distinct from a doctrinal one.
A doctrinal scale will necessarily be more contextual than a left/right scale,
such that the dimension that is salient for one particular class of disputes may
not necessarily be salient for another. Within a doctrinal context, for example,
we would not necessarily expect to see obvious continuity between the approach
taken in landlord-tenant disputes and in cases involving the extent of state power
to regulate the press. We accordingly selected a subset of cases, cases against
public bodies, for our analysis.
Our scale was constructed on the basis of Harlow and Rawlings’ distinction
between ‘red light’ and ‘green light’ judicial attitudes towards administrative
discretion, according to whether they see the proper role of the courts as taking
respectively a restrictive or a permissive attitude.38 We sought to study whether
judges differ in their attitudes towards state actors—in terms of some judges
being more ‘pro-state’ or ‘green-light’ than others—and whether this disposition,
or attitude, has an effect on how they decide cases. Such a scale is clearly
distinguishable from a left/right scale. Left-wing circles have long been divided
on this issue, seen in the debates—from the early Fabians to the early Labour
party’s conflict between ‘Poplarism’ and the mainstream Labour Party, through
the post-war Labour government to today—between constitutional orthodoxists
and constitutional heretics over constitutional reform, and how broad or narrow
the legal restrictions on government discretion should be.39 Conversely, studies
of the constitution under Thatcher have identified the paradox that, in order to
pursue an agenda of shrinking the state, the ‘New Conservatives’ of the 1980s
assumed powers that were previously unknown to the UK’s Constitution.40
Moreover, unlike a classical left/right dimension, a red-light/green-light di-
ture, London, November 2009) ¡http://www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/EliasLectureSLS24.11.09FINAL.doc¿ accessed 21 December
2015.
36 Ibid.
37 The interview was widely reported in the press. See e.g. Steven Swinford, ‘European
courts have too much power, says former Lord Chief Justice’, The Daily Telegraph (London,
28 December 2013) ¡http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10540275/European-courts-
have-too-much-power-says-former-Lord-Chief-Justice.html¿ accessed 21 December 2015.
38 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press September 2009).
39 See Anthony Wright, ‘British Socialists and the British Constitution’ (1990) 43 Parlia-
mentary Affairs 322.
40 C Graham and T Prosser, Waiving the Rules: The Constitution under Thatcherism
(Open University Press 1988).
2 Testing the doctrinal model statistically 10
mension seems, on casual observation, to capture much of the disagreement
between judges across a range of specific issues. Recent administrative law lit-
erature, particularly in the context of the Human Rights Act, expresses Harlow
and Rawlings’s red-light/green-light dimension in terms of the degree of ‘def-
erence’ due to decision-makers on whom a discretion has been conferred. But
while the basic terms of disagreement are clearest in administrative law where
the control of executive discretion is of central concern, they also can be seen
to capture the contours of judicial disagreement where the state’s actions are
challenged in private law. Of central significance to all cases against the state,
regardless of whether they are brought in public or private law, is the extent to
which the law gives discretionary powers to executive government bodies. An
assertion that the police owed a duty of care to a victim of crime, or that a
local authority owed a duty to abused children involves an assertion that the
state body in question does not enjoy an unfettered privilege to act or decide
as it chooses; instead, it is subject to a legal duty that restricts its freedom of
action in relation to the manner in which it may act or decide. A decision either
way falls within a red-light / green-light spectrum in private law as much as in
public law.
2.2 Data and modelling
The primary difficulty to be overcome in measuring judicial attitudes is that—
like many other constructs of interest to academic lawyers—they are not directly
observable: in statistical terms they are latent variables. Being unobservable
does not, however, mean that they are not measurable. We can, and do, observe
manifestations or indicators of these latent properties. In the case of judicial
attitudes, the most obvious of these are the outcomes which a judge chooses in
his or her decisions.41 A range of statistical techniques can be used to estimate
judicial attitudes from their decisions. We employed a modelling technique
called Bayesian ideal point estimation, which estimates each judge’s attitude as
an ‘ideal point’ on a scale relative to other judges. A full explanation of this
technique, along with our reasons for choosing it and the technical details of our
model, is set out in a supplementary appendix to this paper.42
The data on which we ran the model consisted of all non-unanimous cases
involving a challenge to a decision of a state body between Hilary term 1985
and the end of Trinity Term 2015, a period of just over 30 years.43 Due to the
high degree of consensus among judges on the top court, this gave us 150 cases.
Each judge’s decision in each case was assigned a value of 2, 0 or 1 according
whether that judge’s ruling gave the state body a win, a loss, or a partial win.
41 Other possible sources include textual analysis of the words in which judges express them-
selves in their decisions, or data obtained from elite interviews as in the work of Alan Paterson.
42 The supplementary appendix is not printed here for reasons of space and complexity. It
is available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=0000000, or by contacting the authors.
43 The restriction of our analysis to non-unanimous reflects the fact that our model operates
on a relative scale. Only cases incorporating a dissent provide information about the relative
positions of judges.
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This is the most natural form of coding to estimate relative positions on a red-
light/green-light scale. In a case where some judges have held for the state
and some against, a judge who has held against the state at least partially
has by definition found that discretion was wrongly exercised to some extent.
This means that he or she has by necessary implication set narrower bounds on
executive discretion than a judge who has held for the state in the same case,
and hence is by definition more ‘red-light’.
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Fig. 1: Ideal points and judges voting (a) by dissents and (b) by pro-state de-
cisions. There is no obvious evidence of a relationship between esti-
mated ideal points and propensity to dissent, whereas there is a clear
and positive relationship between the number of pro-state decisions and
the estimated ideal point. This suggests that our estimated ideal points
are interpretable as spatial estimates of ideological positions on a red-
light/green-light axis.
The results of running our model against the data bear out our initial hy-
pothesis that a red-light/green-light dimension is a better way of characterising
judicial attitudes than a classical left/right scale. Before turning to our substan-
tive findings, it is useful to explain why. The mere fact that a model produces
results does not, in and of itself, vindicate the hypothesis it represents. Our hy-
pothesis is, however, vindicated when our results are compared statistically with
those obtained by Chris Hanretty, a political scientist who ran a similar analysis
of decisions of the House of Lords, but using the traditional liberal/conservative
political scale. Hanretty found that although his model produced results in
the form of ideal points, when subjected to conventional statistical tests, the
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ideal points turned out to only measure a judge’s “propensity to dissent.” He
came to this conclusion by comparing a regression of his results against the pro-
portion of cases in which a judge supported the liberal-coded outcome, with a
regression against the proportion of dissenting judgements.44 This approach to
testing fit is sound, and we replicated it on our results with the opposite result
to Hanretty’s. Figure 1 shows in the left panel a regression of our results against
proportion of dissents, and on the right against the proportion of pro-state deci-
sions. Inspecting Figure 1 shows no obvious relationship between our estimated
ideal points and willingness to dissent, while there is a clear (and positive) rela-
tionship between estimated ideal point and the proportion of (wholly) pro-state
decisions.
The comparison with the equivalent diagnostic in Hanretty is remarkable.
The difference demonstrates that a red-light/green-light scale encodes a dimen-
sion of judicial disagreement that is both more meaningful and more salient than
the conventional liberal/conservative scale that informed Hanretty’s work. Em-
pirical techniques, it would seem, offer evidence in support of the “legal model”,
and of the idea that it is doctrinal positions, rather than political positions, that
play a determinative role in adjudication—at least, as far as the UK’s judiciary
is concerned.
2.3 The dispositions of the judges
We now turn to discussing our substantive results and their significance. Fig-
ure 2 shows one presentation of the findings of our model: estimated ideal points
on our red-light/green-light scale, arrayed from the most green-light at the top
right of the plot down to the most red-light in the bottom left. For each judge,
Figure 2 captures a 95% Bayesian credible interval, overlaid with a 50% credible
interval represented by the thick grey line. Judges positioned further towards
the right can be understood as adopting a relatively more permissive approach
towards the state, or (equivalently) as extending a greater degree of latitude
to state actors, while judges further towards the left can be seen as adopting a
more restrictive approach.45
There is a good deal of separation in these ideal point estimates, suggesting
that there are meaningful differences among judges. For example, there is no
overlap between the 95% credible intervals of the most green-light judge (by
point estimate), Lord Brown, and that of Lord Hope, who lies in the middle
of the range; neither is there any overlap between the 95% credible intervals
of Lords Hope and those of Lord Kerr and Lady Hale at the red-light end
of the scale. We can also see a good level of separation between such infra-
marginal judges such as Lords Phillips and Lord Carswell, or Lord Mance and
Lord Walker. The implication of these results is that judicial attitudes clearly
44 Hanretty (n 16) 713–714.
45 For present purposes, we make no distinction between the central, local and devolved
levels of government, or between executive and judicial authority. This is a topic we intend
to explore in future work.
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Fig. 2: Estimated ideal points on a red-light/green-light scale. Judges towards the
top-right of the figure have more green-light views than judges towards
the bottom-left. The thick grey lines plot a 50% highest posterior density
(HPD) region, while the thin grey lines plot a 95% HPD interval.
matter. Judges are not ‘blank slates’ whose attitudes towards the latitude to
be given to state bodies are indistinguishable from one another.
Among the judges that occupy the most green-light positions (by point es-
timate) are Lords Brown, Rodger, Carswell and Walker. At the other end of
the spectrum, Lord Kerr, Lady Hale and Lord Phillips represent the most red-
light positions. The estimated positions of the UK’s top judges on a red-light/
green-light scale also serves to contrast our doctrinal model from more con-
ventional interpretations of the attitudinal model which seeks to locate judicial
attitudes on a liberal/conservative scale. For example, at the green-light end of
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the spectrum, we can see a former Conservative minister, Lord Rodger, holding
a position barely distinguishable from Lord Carswell, appointed by a Labour
Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Similarly, at the green-light end, we find Lord
Goff, a Conservative judicial appointment, occupying a similar position to Lord
Phillips, a Labour appointment. It would be difficult to explain some of these
appointments—on most theories of political decision-making, at any rate—if,
counter-factually, these were measures of judicial ideology on an overtly politi-
cal scale. Yet such observations sit perfectly comfortably with our attempt to
measure judges’ positions on a doctrinal scale.
Our approach, and the findings they generate are important also in that
they enable us to look at judges’ positions in the round. While not intending to
be a substitute to for a close reading of particular judgments, it is perhaps an
important corrective. For example, by focusing on a decision like the Belmarsh
detainees case, one might get an impression that Lord Hoffmann is one of the
most clearly red-light judges. Yet this is the same Lord Hoffmann who held
in Bancoult that the expulsion of a population from its homeland without due
process was lawful. Looking to the pattern of decided cases as a whole it is clear
that the Hoffmann of Bancoult is the more typical—some 59% of his judgments
were fully in favour of the state. This also shows that advantages of Bayesian
item-response theory, which takes account of the ‘difficulty’ of cases—i.e. the
extent to which the issues raised in the case were such that holding for the state
would require a pronounced green-light stance—over simpler analyses based
purely on ‘win ratios’.46
3 Institutional Implications: Preserving a fine balance
The model set out in Part II has demonstrated that differences in the judicial
dispositions of individual judges are real and estimable from their decisions—
in other words, they affect the decisions of individual judges in the cases they
hear. In the context of the UK’s judiciary, these decisions are best characterized
as reflecting doctrinal positions on a red-light/ green-light sclae, rather than
positions on a left/ right scale. Contrary to what one might expect, however,
this should lead lawyers to engage more, not less, with questions of institutional
structure and design.
In the first place, the fact that it is doctrinal, rather than political, disposi-
tions that matter should not allay concerns about the institutional role of the
judiciary in the modern state. One of the more important institutional implica-
tions of the attitudinal model is that it matters who decides a case. This insight
holds regardless of whether the underlying attitudes are party-political or doc-
trinal. We show in Figure 3, below, that the degree of judicial disagreement is
sufficiently great that—to the conventional standards of statistical reliability—
bench composition can still matter to how cases are decided, at least sometimes.
Figure 3 shows the estimated median ideal point for each of the cases in our
analysis, with the vertical line indicating the point estimate for the median
46 For example, the work of Poole and Shah: see Poole and Shah (n 15).
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judge in our analysis. In other words, our analysis suggests that many cases in
our sample were heard by a bench clearly more favourable to the state—or to
those challenging a decision of the state—than other possible benches.
The problems of panel constitution—and, in particular, the issues posed by
panels skewed away from the overall median—is one that is familiar to political
scientists.47 This problem does not go away if the salient dimension is doctri-
nally defined. At one level, this ought not to tell us anything new. We are,
so cognitive science tells us, strongly influenced by our prior beliefs and lean-
ings in processing or evaluating any new information or situation.48 There is
no reason at all to suppose that judges would be an exception to this general
rule. Nevertheless, the result is important. If the Chagos Islanders (to pick up
one example from the top quarter of Figure 3) lost their appeal to be restored
to their homeland simply because their cases came up before a panel that was
more ‘green-light’ than other panels might have been, or if the Revenue in Sem-
pra Metals (to pick an example from the bottom quarter of Figure 3) would
actually have succeeded in their claim had a slightly different bench heard the
appeal, then the judicial system falls seriously short of fulfilling the role it is
commonly taken to have. Despite this, the fallacy that this problem only affects
a ‘politicized’ judiciary continues to (mis)inform debates on the reform of judi-
cial institutions, as the statement by the Department of Constitutional Affairs
at the head of this paper demonstrates.49
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that a panel skewed away from a
doctrinal median affects not only the outcomes of the specific cases which that
panel hears, but also the way that the decision is justified in terms of doctrine
and, hence, the direction in which the law develops. Sempra Metals is a leading
case in the law of restitution, and the law would look different if the minority
view – emphasising the role of judicial discretion and equitable principles in
restitutionary remedies – had prevailed, rather than the more rigid approach
that we see in the majority decision, which held the remedy to be available as a
matter of right. The entire direction of the development of the common law in
certain areas could thus quite conceivably be determined by the circumstances
of the selection of a panel of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, permissiveness towards the state is just one dimension of judi-
cial disagreement. Legal theory suggests several other such dimensions which
may matter. Adams and Brownsword have suggested that judges in contract
disputes in the higher courts are guided (to varying degrees) by the compet-
ing ideologies of ‘market individualism’ and ‘consumer welfarism’, which, so
they maintain, cut across traditional judicial ideologies of formalism and real-
47 Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, ‘Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control’ (1987) 3(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation
243, 262.
48 For an overview of application of cognitive science to law, see the collection in Cass
Sunstein (ed), Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge University PRess 2000)
49 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the
United Kingdom (Consultation Paper, CP 11/03) (Department of Constitutional Affairs
2003), para. 52.
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Fig. 3: The effect of bench composition on outcomes. This figure plots point
estimates and 95% HPD intervals for the position of the median judge
in each of the cases in our analysis. Large differences from the centre at
the top and bottom of the graph indicate cases in which it is possible that
the composition of the bench had an effect on the outcome of the case.
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ism.50 Another example, applicable to the field of constitutional law, is judges’
views on the relative weight which ought to be given to different mechanisms
for regulating government—in particular, the balance between what Tomkins
calls legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism, a dimension which
in his view divided the majority from the dissenting views in the Fire Brigades
Union case.51 There is no a priori reason to suppose that differences in these
dimensions are any less pronounced than in the dimension we have studied here,
nor that the composition of benches makes any less of a difference.
Against the background of our findings, the structure and functioning of our
judicial system—which has continued to assume that who hears a case does not
matter—is hard to justify. We stress that our findings do not in any way impugn
the personalities or motives of the judges. As we have sought to emphasise, it is
inevitable that people are influenced by their prior beliefs. The problem, rather,
is one of institutional design. Public administration scholarship has for centuries
given serious thought to how executive government institutions should be struc-
tured so that the attitudes and preferences of those who staffed them should
work towards and not against the demands we make of them. Debates between
Bentham and Mill over whether executive authority and responsibility should
be vested in committees or in ‘single seated functionaries’,52 through Donald
Kingsley’s characterisation of the UK’s civil service as a ‘representative bureau-
cracy’,53 to Vincent Ostrom’s54 contrast between the competing paradigms of
‘bureaucratic administration’ and ‘democratic administration’ form part of the
background to discussion of administrative reform and design of regulatory in-
stitutions. In the modern literature, these classical ideas have been formalised
within a powerful body of theory on institutional design.55 Unfortunately, sim-
ilar efforts have not been made to articulate a theoretical perspective on the
design of judicial institutions, nor has law reform in practice grappled with
these issues.
Further, as the public administration literature indicates, the issues stretch
beyond the narrow issue of bench selection to the way judges are selected for
higher office and the way cases are chosen for consideration by the Supreme
50 JN Adams and R Brownsword, ‘The Ideologies of Contract’ (1987) 7(2) Legal Studies
205.
51 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995]
2 AC 513. For Tomkins’s analysis, see Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon Press 2003)
18-30.
52 Bernard Schaffer, ‘The Idea of the Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot’
(1957) 3(1) Australian Journal of Politics & History 60.
53 see Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil
Service (Antioch Press 1944).
54 Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (Second Edi-
tion, University Alabama Press 1989).
55 In the US context, a seminal contribution is the work of ‘McNollgast’: McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast, ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’ (n 47);Matthew
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, ‘Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Ad-
ministrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’ (1989) 75(2) Virginia Law
Review 431. Murray Horn applies these ideas within the context of ‘Westminster’ style Democ-
racies. See Murray J Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional
Choice in the Public Sector (Cambridge Univ Pessr 1995).
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Court. Part IV of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 gives an important and
over-riding symbolic commitment to a professionalised judiciary56 and to the
continuing “need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for
selection for appointments.”57 Diversity is often seen in terms of ethnic or gen-
der diversity – most notoriously in Lord Sumption’s repeated remarks about
the downsides of diversity – but our findings suggest the importance of taking
a broader view. Would the balance of dispositions in the UK’s courts differ if
judges were recruited from a legally-relevant, but not practitioner-based, back-
ground, for example lawyers working for housing charities, or for Citizens Advice
Bureaux? Without making specific recommendations here, our findings under-
score the need to think systematically about the design of judicial institutions,
and how these can ensure an appropriate balance of attitudes and dispositions,
however those may be defined. In this respect the lack of such thinking in delib-
erations surrounding the Constitutional Reform Act, or for that matter in the
currently ongoing debate about the possible repeal of the Human Rights Act, is
disappointing. Much more sophisticated analysis is needed of the relationship
between legal institutions, legal doctrine and case outcomes,58 as the public
administration scholarship listed above demonstrates.
Equally, a disregard for questions of institutional design when it comes to
constitutional changes affecting the judiciary is problematic because the insti-
tutional role discharged by the judiciary within the governing institutions of
the UK is, as we have argued, the result of a number of finely-balanced fac-
tors. To the extent the ‘embedded autonomy’ of the senior judiciary depends
on a fine balance it is vulnerable to disruption on a number of fronts. Evans
himself pointed out that complacency about the success of an institutional con-
figuration could end up undermining the very embedded autonomy that had
created it.59 From this perspective, complacency about the apolitical character
of judging could end up undermining that very character, in the absence of a
corresponding awareness of the delicate institutional configuration that makes
this apolitical character possible. If we accept—as we argued above—that de-
ciding cases on doctrinal grounds is preferable to a nakedly political appellate
jurisdiction, then there are reasons to find a number of current trends worrying.
In recent constitutional changes, all too little attention has been paid to the
twinning of embeddedness and autonomy, and the delicate balance of institu-
tional arrangements on which it rests. The tendency is, instead, for traditional,
‘commonsense’ categories to be replaced by frameworks which lack not only the
embeddeness of those they replaced but also their autonomy, in that they are
rooted in ideological approaches that are both remote from everyday experience
and more overtly political. This is true across a range of private and public
law matters, but given its prominence in current political debates, the way in
which the law protects human rights serves as a good example. In the new
56 S. 62.
57 S. 63.
58 This point has been emphasized by a number of legal theorists. See Alan Paterson, Final
Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013).
59 Evans (n 26) 229.
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approach introduced by the Human Rights Act, judges review policy decisions
using a conceptual apparatus and framework—a dimension of salience—that is
far more closely connected with political ideology than its predecessors were.
Rather than focusing simply on whether a particular action falls within the
powers given to the state body, approaches grounded in human rights require
judges to consider whether the action concerned was normatively justifiable—for
example because it was proportionate to achieving some acceptable purpose.
Such an approach to adjudication not only enables but actually requires con-
siderations of political ideology (as distinct from doctrine) to be factored into
judicial decision-making. The dimension that is salient to deciding a particular
case under human rights law may well not be the dimension that was salient in
the process of making the particular policy in question, but it is nevertheless a
dimension of salience taken from the world of political ideology. The result is to
require courts to assert the primacy of one dimension of salience derived from
political ideology over all others, regardless of whether this reflects the perspec-
tives on primacy held by policymakers and the common public. This presents a
stark contrast with the more traditional ‘common law’ approaches to adjudicat-
ing disputes arising from administrative decision making, which sought to insti-
tutionally entrench an approach wherein the dimensions of salience that judges
bring to bear in decision making were insulated from dimensions of salience
derived from the world of political ideology.
It has not been our purpose, in making these points about human rights, to
argue either for the greater entrenchment of human rights within the legal sys-
tem, or for a return to the good old rules of the common law through a British
Bill of Rights. The point we seek to make is the precise opposite, namely, the
poverty of a debate framed in terms of such simplistic dichotomies. Our purpose
has been to point to the institutional issues which such a frame leaves unad-
dressed, but which must be addressed if reforms are to be effective and not have
unintended consequences. These issues remain pertinent, regardless of whether
the law is framed in terms of human rights, or in terms of ‘British’ rights, or
a souped-up system of judicial review. Changes to an institution’s terms of
reference or the profile of its work have the potential to affect its functioning
in far-reaching ways. Given this, it is troubling that so little thought has been
given to these issues in recent reforms—including not just the introduction of
the conceptual apparatus of human rights or its proposed abolition, but also
other reforms such as the abolition of legal aid and the introduction of marke-
tised mechanisms of funding civil litigation, all of which are likely to significantly
transform the profiles of the litigants and the cases that come before the courts.
4 Conclusion
Although the judiciary has long been acknowledged to be the third branch of
government, its functioning as a branch of government remains understudied
and under-theorised in the UK when compared with the other branches, and
it has remained shrouded in what is almost an air of mystique. In relation
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to members of the other two branches—the legislature and executive—much
attention has been devoted to how ideological and other similar factors affect
their behaviour, and how this in turn affects the effective discharge by these
bodies of their role. This has produced a rich literature on institutional design
and governance, of which account is taken by policymakers when designing new
administrative institutions or regulatory bodies. But very little attention has
been paid to these questions as far as the judicial branch of government in the
UK is concerned.
Our aim in this article has been to point out that this is problematic. Judges
are people—talented and committed people, certainly, but people nevertheless.
The institutional effectiveness of our highest court is, therefore, subject to the
same type of pressures and constraints as any other group. The failure to study
these is problematic not just because it leaves a vital branch of government
unstudied and relatively poorly understood. The expansion of the British state
in the past hundred years has arguably changed the nature of the relationship
between the judiciary and the other branches of government. The growth of
regulation has vastly expanded the judiciary’s public law role in reviewing the
actions of executive and administrative authorities, as well as its private law
role—for example, dealing with negligence in the discharge of statutory or regu-
latory functions. The growth and subsequent shrinkage of the welfare state, and
the consequent shifts in the services provided by the state to citizens, have also
brought about a significant rise in actions against the state. Finally, and most
recently, the Human Rights Act has given the judiciary considerable new powers
to review the actions and policies of the other branches of government. These
are fundamental changes in politically and ideologically charged areas, and they
make it imperative that we ask the questions in relation to the judiciary that
we have long asked in relation to other branches of government.
The United Kingdom has been fortunate in that the upper tiers of the ju-
diciary have during the course of the twentieth century evolved institutional
strategies that have had the effect of mitigating the impact of the overtly polit-
ical aspects of the issues with which they must deal. The result is valuable and
worth preserving – a highest court that is neither as politicised nor as systemat-
ically influenced by political ideologies as the US Supreme Court is commonly
said to be. Yet, as we have shown here, these strategies are far from robust.
They rest on a fragile institutional balance, which is easily undermined.
Much recent reform has proceeded on the implicit assumption that institu-
tional strategies will remain unaffected despite the constant and far-reaching
tinkering with the jurisdiction, functioning and workload of the judiciary that
has characterised the past four decades. There is no rational basis for this as-
sumption, which flies in the face of everything theories of institutions tell us
about the impact of changing environments upon the institution and upon ac-
tors seeking to work within the institutional framework. This confidence, and
the absence of any real attempt to verify its validity, presents a particularly
stark contrast with the debate over reforming the upper chamber of the UK’s
Parliament by turning it from being a chamber consisting entirely of unelected
members, to being a chamber consisting mostly or entirely of elected members.
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The debate here has focused in great depth on the question of how such a reform
might affect the institutional relationship between the two houses of Parliament,
and on the impact it may have on the (currently) acknowledged supremacy of
the lower house. This suggests that the failure to consider the institutional
impact of reforms is not intrinsic to politics. Rather, it reflects the limitations
of the way the structure and operation of the judiciary are understood and
theorised.
What, then, is the way forward? Our aim in this article has been to point
the way towards what must be our ultimate goal if we are to be effective in
studying the judiciary—namely, the creation of a proper institutionalist account
of the judicial branch of government which studies the norms, conventions, aims,
purposes and strategies that underlie the functioning of the judiciary, and the
institutional processes by which these evolve, change, are adapted to new uses,
and disappear, rather than simply starting with assumptions as to what these
are. Such a model, which we have taken steps towards outlining, not only
parallels the standard models that are used to study, for example, the behaviour
of members of bureaucracies, but also avoids the reductionist simplifications
that plague existing models of the judiciary, whether ‘legal’ or ‘political’. At
the level of theory and methodology, we have demonstrated here that the legal
account of judicial decision-making, far from being opposed to standard theories
of political institutions, is entirely compatible with them. When put together,
the two offer an understanding of the nature and role of the judiciary that has
much greater explanatory value than either discipline can offer by itself. Such a
combination is, therefore, not only desirable, but also of importance in terms of
its contribution to theoretical accounts of the modern British state. It is only
through an approach that brings the two together that we can fully begin to
understand the role of the judiciary in governance in the UK, and work towards
preserving its best features in the face of the continuing trend of radical reforms
to the court system.
